Leftwing Madness Explained

Archive for November, 2009

11/30/2009

Individualism in John Rawls


Rawls refers to his theory of justice as “individualistic” (Theory, page 263, 264,520, 584). Some readers have been confused by this and interpreted his view as in some way individualistic. It is not.

Rawls’s first order of business is the deconstruction of the individual. He believes he accomplishes this by denying meaningful agency and moral desert of the individual and imputing agency and moral desert to society.

This places all resources – including labor and intellectual resources of the individual – at the disposal of the collective to distribute as the collective, i.e., society, sees fit.

At this point, where everything within society is at the disposal of the collective, Rawls sees two choices. One is utilitarianism often associated with democratic socialism. Rawls names utilitarianism as the main rival of his system of justice. His theory of justice should replace utilitarianism.

The problem with utilitarianism is that its is wholly collectivist. If torturing a child brought about the net sum of happiness greater than if the child was not tortured, then utilitarianism demands that the child be tortured.

Enter Rawls’s theory of justice. We keep most of the utilitarianism, but we contract for individual rights which limit the collectivism and establish some degree of individual sovereignty. Or so he supposes.

This is what Rawls refers to when he refers to his theory as “individualistic.”

The individualism which Rawls refers to is not basic individualism. Individualism in the base of a political theory assumes that the individual is sovereign to begin with. Individualism in the base of a political theory assumes that the collective is not sovereign. Insofar as individualism assumes that individuals are sovereign, it assumes that any redistribution of that sovereignty must be consented to by the individual, not the collective.

Rawls’s individualism on the other hand is merely a tiny and contingent concession by the sovereign collective to individuals; in no way are individuals at any point seen as sovereign. At all times, no matter what rights are granted to individuals, is the individual sovereign. The collective retains its sovereignty and may revoke or deny any individual rights at any time.

This is in stark contrast to individualism, which assumes from the beginning that individuals are sovereign and it is up to the individual to consent to any contract which impinges upon that sovereignty.

Now one criticism which may be made by a defender of Rawls is that Rawls bases his theory of justice on the model provided by social contract theory, which may be individualistic.

Social contract theory is individualistic when it requires individuals to consent to the contract in order to be bound by its obligations. Social contract theory is collectivist when it requires the consent of whichever group is named as the collective.

Democratic social contract theory, which Rawls represents, is not individualistic. Democratic social contract theory assumes that the majority is sovereign. Individual consent is meaningless in democratic social contract theory.

Rawls’s social contract theory is not purely democratic, although he assumes democratic sovereignty at a later stage in his theory. Rawls’s social contract theory is most accurately described as a hypothetical social contract theory which claims a moral right to consent.

Strictly speaking, it is not a social contract theory because it does not require the consent of a single person or group. It proposes a social contract and then argues that no actual living person would consent to it; but if we were free from our individual biases in a hypothetical “original position”, behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance”, we would agree that we have a moral obligation to consent to such a social contract.

So, in conclusion, no, Rawls’s theory is not individualistic. If we are to label a social contract theory by the consent which it demands in order to justify itself, then Rawls’s theory is neither individualist nor is it collectivist. It bases its justification on hypothesized consent due to moral obligation, so we might label it a moral-hypothetical theory.

It should be noted that nobody I know of retains full sovereignty within society. When I contract with health care insurer, I have forfeited a limited amount of sovereignty – namely, my sovereignty over the exact amount of money that the contract stipulates I pay every month. The insurer has likewise contracted away a certain amount of sovereignty – namely, the amount of their earnings required to meet my health care needs.

When we contract as individuals, it’s individualism. When the collective claims sovereignty and trades away my freedom without my consent, it’s called collectivism.

11/29/2009

My Rejection of Public Morality


It seems appropriate for an individual who has adopted skepticism to reject morality. But before we do so, we must first know what we are rejecting.

Generally speaking, the attachment of values to actions, intentions (deontological ethics), personality traits (virtue ethics), to outcomes (consequentialism).

Morality comes in many forms. Moral realism (Thomas Nagel) is quite popular, as is moral constructivism (John Rawls).

The most popular system of morality is without a doubt utilitarianism. Most public debate is conducted in utilitarian terms even when the debaters themselves make no reference to utilitarianism.

But that’s beside the point. My purpose here today is to offer a good reason for rejecting morality. I will do so on the grounds of skepticism. That is to say, I see no compelling argument that moral statements are truth-apt.

When somebody says, “stealing is morally wrong”, he is attempting to say that something external to his person has declared stealing to be wrong. But no part of physical reality external to the man has made such a declaration. No matter how hard he is pressed to point out that external authority, he cannot.

For this reason, I dismiss public expressions of morality as meaningless.

I will grant that people do have feelings or thoughts which they describe as “moral” and those do not concern me, just as it does not concern me that Bob likes blue shirts and Jill prefers to wear green shirts.

11/29/2009

Skepticism is the Starting Point


I sometimes wonder if the real purpose of this organism which we call a human being is to discover truth. Certainly curiosity is more than a passing fancy.

In philosophy, knowing truth is the matter at hand. There are no other issues to be dealt with. And that means that when discussing philosophy at least, the starting point must be critical skepticism.

Why, a skeptic might ask, is skepticism the starting point? Like most statements which are true, this one is true because the alternatives are unacceptable. In the absence of skepticism, an individual is prone to believe a proposition to be true which may in fact turn out to be false. Uncritical thinkers do this everyday, and the actions they base on those incorrect assumptions often have steep price tags.

If we grant, for the sake of discussion, that the purpose of philosophy is to know the truth, it follows that allowing untrue assumptions to enter into our premises defeats our purposes.

Take natural rights as an example. Once it is uncritically granted that natural rights do exist – despite no cogent argument or proof of any kind – we have to deal with all sorts of meaningless arguments for animal rights as natural rights, property rights as natural rights, abortion as a natural right, democracy as a natural right, health care as natural right and so on. No natural right has ever been proven and the time wasted discussing it would better be used discussing more tangible items, like the tooth fairy.

The primary problem with uncritical thought, with unskeptical thinkers, is that they impede meaningful debate. As individuals working together with some common goals, debate is the practical foundation of society. When an uncritical thinker invokes natural rights, say, as justification for a national health care scheme, he has effectively derailed meaningful debate.

Skepticism means that we withhold belief in the absence of overwhelming evidence. Skepticism in the public sphere demands that we dismiss unceremoniously propositions that are not accompanied by proof.

If we can agree to be skeptical, our debates will be meaningful and we may just be able to precipitate progress.

11/25/2009

John Stuart Mill in Favor of Capital Punishment


John Stuart Mill on Capital Punishment